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Background: Street-level workers play a key role in public health policies in Africa, as they are often the ones to
ensure their implementation. In Burkina Faso, the State formulated two different user-fee exemption policies for
indigents, one for deliveries (2007), and one for primary healthcare (2009). The objective of this study was to
measure and understand the determinants of street-level workers’ knowledge and application of these exemption
measures.
Methods: We used cross-sectional data collected between October 2013 and March 2014. The survey targeted
1521 health workers distributed in 498 first-line centres, 18 district hospitals, 5 regional hospitals, and 11 private or
other facilities across 24 districts. We used four different random effects models to identify factors associated with
knowledge and application of each of the above-mentioned exemption policies.
Results: Only 9.2% of workers surveyed knew of the directive exempting the worst-off, and only 5% implemented it.
Knowledge and application of the delivery exemption were higher, with 27% of all health workers being aware of the
delivery exemption directive and 24.2% applying it. Mobile health workers were found to be consistently more likely to
apply both exemptions. Health workers who were facility heads were significantly more likely to know about the
indigent exemption for primary health care and to apply it. Health workers in districts with higher proportions of very
poor people were significantly more likely to know about and apply the delivery exemption. Nearly 60% of respondents
indicated either 5% or 10% as the percentage of people they would deem adequate to target for exemption.
Conclusion: This quantitative study confirmed earlier qualitative results on the importance of training and informing
health workers and monitoring the measures targeting equity, to ensure compliance with government directives. The
local context (e.g., hierarchy, health system, interventions) and the ideas that street-level workers have about the policy
instruments can influence their effective implementation. Methods for remunerating health workers and health centres
also need to be adapted to ensure equity measures are applied to achieve universal healthcare.
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While decision-makers are essential in ensuring the suc-
cess of public policies, studies have shown the key role of
street-level workers in implementation of public policy
[1]. In fact, political will and the allocation of public funds
for healthcare are not enough to ensure that a planned
policy will become a reality [2]. Labeled as “policy imple-
menters” or true “policy-makers”, street-level workers are
frontline health workers who operate at the interface be-
tween decision-makers and the beneficiaries of policies. In
their position, they can exert considerable influence on
their “effective implementation” [3]. In the context of Bur-
kina Faso, street-level workers are, for example, nurses,
midwives, doctors and mobile health workers, who are in
direct contact with health care users and who are asked to
apply state-led user fees exemption measures for indi-
gents. Street-level workers decide whether they ignore or
implement these measures. Through their actions, their
“dispositions” [3], their interpretations of the policy instru-
ments (e.g. exemption), or even their ideas about those in-
struments, they can considerably influence a policy’s
implementation [4, 5]. Moreover, while the number of
quantitative studies on the implementation of public pol-
icies is growing, they are still less common than qualitative
approaches, and very rare in Africa [6].
In the African Region, evidence on the implementation
of public policies is still limited, both in the field of health
[7, 8] and in the study of the role of street-level workers
[9]. Yet we know that street-level workers’ coping strat-
egies in Niger or Mali [10, 11] and their relationships with
communities in Burkina Faso [12] have had strong impact
on the implementation of recent policies to subsidize the
costs of healthcare. Additionally, studies that assess the
role of street-level workers in implementation of exemp-
tion policies targeting those who are socially and econom-
ically disadvantaged are even more rare [13].
On global level, user fees exemption policies have been
recognized as essential measure for nations to move to-
wards universal health coverage (UHC). Exemption pol-
icies are based on the recogniction that certain segments
of the population are simply not able to pay for the care
they need, not even in tax-based or social health insurance
systems [14]. Hence, States are constantly confronted with
the need to decide who should be exempted and how to
fund such exemption mechanisms. The current global dis-
course on UHC points at the objective not to leave anyone
behind [15], otherwise exemplified by a statement made
by a relevant WHO consultative group pointing at an un-
acceptable implicit trade-off when decisions are made "to
expand coverage for well-off groups before doing so for
worse-off groups" [16].
A collective work published in French presented sev-
eral analyses of these types of public policies in African
countries [13]; however, these analyses were mainlyqualitative. In Ghana, a study based on 13 interviews re-
vealed the low level of knowledge among health profes-
sionals, as street-level workers, regarding exemption
measures for persons under 18 years of age in the con-
text of the national insurance system [17]. In Sudan, a
qualitative study with 177 key informants showed that
their levels of knowledge about the content of the user
fee exemption policy varied greatly [18]. In South Africa,
Niger, and Burkina Faso, three quantitative surveys used
the same structured questionnaire to measure health
workers’ perceptions regarding exemption policies, but
the sample sizes were small and the analyses were de-
scriptive [19–21]. These studies showed that health
workers are relatively satisfied with the exemption
principle, but are relatively unhappy with the implemen-
tation challenges of these policies. Health workers also
worried about the sustainability of these policies and the
ability of States to maintain them over time.
To our knowledge, no large-scale study in Africa has
measured street-level workers’ level of knowledge and ap-
plication of exemption measures. Yet “compliance with
statutes’ directives” is one of the dimensions of “successful
implementation” [3]. As such, it is important to gather
evidence on this subject, since we know that, in Burkina
Faso, exemption measures targeting indigents for primary
healthcare that date back to 1993 have not yet been imple-
mented [22] and those of 2007 targeting indigent pregnant
women at deliveries are implemented very sparsely [23].
Thus, the primary objective of this study was to meas-
ure and understand the factors associated with health
workers’ knowledge and application of user fee exemp-
tion policies targeting primary healthcare for indigents
and deliveries for indigent women. Both policies are
meant as part of a wider strategy to promote UHC in
Burkina Faso. The secondary objective was to under-
stand their preferences regarding what proportion of the
population might appropriately be considered indigent
in order to qualify for this payment exemption.
Methods
Hypotheses
Given the very low use of health services by indigents in
Burkina Faso [24], we hypothesized that street-level
workers’ knowledge and application of exemption mea-
sures were also very low. In addition, given the pyram-
idal structure of the health system, we hypothesized that
street-level workers’ knowledge and application of these
measures would increase in proportion to their levels of
education and job responsibility. However, we also ex-
pected that personnel working in obstetric services
would be more knowledgeable about the user fee ex-
emption for indigent women’s deliveries and would
apply those measures more often than would others.
Given the conflict of interest that arises because health
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the fees paid locally by users for curative consultations
[25], we hypothesized that the application of the general
exemption would be lower than that of the delivery ex-
emption, which is reimbursed by the central level.
Study setting
Burkina Faso is a French-speaking landlocked country in
West Africa. It has a population of approximately 18 mil-
lion people, mostly engaged in the informal sector, primar-
ily in subsistence agriculture [26]. With an annual per
capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of USD 650 (2016),
Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in the world,
where nearly 44% (2014) of the population live below the
national poverty line of USD 1.90 a day [26].
In 2014, total health expenditure in Burkina Faso
amounted to nearly 5% of GDP, with private out-of-
pocket expenditure accounting for nearly half (48%) of
this amount. Health service provision is organized in a
three-tier system, with first-line facilities (Centre de
Santé et Promotion Sociale – CSPS) located in the rural
areas, second-line facilities in the district capitals, and
tertiary referral facilities located in the regional capitals
and in Ouagadougou. Health service provision continues
to be characterized by large inequalities between rural
and urban areas, mostly due to problems linked to inad-
equately equipped and staffed health facilities [27].
In the early 1990s, the Bamako Initiative, combined
with the introduction of structural adjustment policies,
resulted in user fees being introduced at all levels of the
health sector [28]. Since then, similarly to what has been
observed elsewhere, user fees in Burkina Faso have been
proven to impede access to care and to expose house-
holds to catastrophic health expenditure [29].
In an attempt to enhance equity in access and foster
financial protection in a system largely based on user
fees, the government of Burkina Faso has enacted two
measures in the years since the 1993 Bamako Initiative.
First, in January 2007, when passing legislation to reduce
user fees for obstetric services, the government decided
to exempt the poorest quintile of women from paying
any fee, including the reduced co-payment for delivery
services foreseen by the new policy. This 2007 measure
was funded by the State’s national budget from 2007 to
2015 [30]. Second, starting in 2009, the government pre-
scribed that the worst-off (les indigents) should be fully
exempted from paying user fees for all preventive and
curative services provided by public facilities. Local
health management committees were mandated to fund
these exemptions by redistributing resources acquired
via cost-recovery schemes. Throughout their implemen-
tation, neither measure has systematically included any
specific effort to identify potential beneficiaries, leaving
it to individual providers to implement the exemption.These two exemption measures are the focus of our
analysis.Study design, data sources, and sampling
To assess knowledge and application of the two exemp-
tion measures described above, we used cross-sectional
data from the baseline round (carried out between Octo-
ber 2013 and March 2014) of the health worker survey
conducted as part of the impact evaluation of a
performance-based financing (PBF) intervention [31].
In line with the World Bank toolkit for impact evalu-
ation [32], the structured survey collected information on
individual health workers, specifically: age, sex, and years
on duty; income and its sources; training and clinical
knowledge; working conditions; and motivation and satis-
faction with multiple aspects of daily work. Given our spe-
cific research interest in exemption policies, we added to
the standard survey tool a section specifically exploring
their knowledge and implementation of existing policies
and their attitudes towards forthcoming ones.
The survey targeted 1521 health workers in all 498 first-
line (CSPS), 23 second- and third-line (district and regional
hospitals) facilities, and 11 private or other facilities in-
cluded in the sample and distributed across 24 districts.
The sample included a census of all public and private fa-
cilities in 12 intervention districts and a random sample of
one-third of all public and private facilities in control dis-
tricts. Research assistants were instructed to interview as
many health workers as possible during their one-day stay
at each facility. In practice, this resulted in approximately
three health workers surveyed per facility, which is equiva-
lent to 80% of all health workers present on facility prem-
ises on the day of the survey (the remaining 20% not being
interviewed due to unavailability or lack of time, not due
systematic screening by the interviewers or to an explicit
refusal). Our sample included an ample variety of health
workers: doctors, registered nurses, assistant nurses, mid-
wives and assistant midwives, as well as mobile health
workers (agents itinérants de santé, AIS). We purposely ad-
ministered the survey to this wide range of health workers
and kept them all in our analysis because they all inter-
acted with patients to provide care and, as such, all made
decisions on the application of exemption policies [27].
We did not restrict our analysis to a specific cadre, as
in other analyses based on the same survey [33]. How-
ever, due to missing data, the effective sample varied
across outcome variables. Specifically, we could obtain
complete information for: a. between 1345 and 1314
health workers on the primary outcomes (for indigent
exemption and delivery exemption respectively); b. be-
tween 1503 and 1472 health workers for the secondary
outcome. Descriptive statistics on 1311 health workers,
due to missing values in the explanatory variables.
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Table 1 provides an overview of all outcome and explana-
tory variables included in the analysis and their measure-
ment. Specifically, we defined four primary outcome
variables: two to assess knowledge of the two above-
mentioned exemption measures and two to assess the ap-
plication of the two measures. All outcome variables were
measured using a dichotomous scale.
Knowledge and application for exemption measures
for preventive and curative services were initially
assessed with the questions outlined below, whereby we
later categorized yes as 1 (one) and no as 0 (zero):
 The planning guidelines of the Directorate of
Studies and Planning since 2009 require that each
health center uses 200,000 F CFA per year for the
user fees exemption of indigents. Question text: Are
you aware of this directive? (Response: yes or no)
 Question text: Have you applied it in your health
center? (Response: yes or no)
Knowledge and application for exemption measures
for for delivery services were initially assessed with the
questions outlined below, whereby we later categorized
yes as 1 (one) and no as 0 (zero):
 As part of the national subsidy for deliveries since
2007, it is expected that 20% of pregnant women are
considered indigents and therefore exempt from
payment of 900 F CFA. Question text: Are you
aware of this directive? (Reponse: yes or no)
 Question text: Have you applied it in your health
center? (Response: yes or no)
We purposely assessed knowledge and application at
the level of the individual health worker and not at the
facility level because, as mentioned, the government left
the responsibility for identifying potentially eligible indi-
viduals up to individual health workers, with no specific
role in this process assigned to the facility administrative
manager. Thus, based on our experience in the country,
we expected to observe variation in both knowledge and
application, even within individual facilities.
Most explanatory variables are self-evident and reflect
the health workers’ sociodemographic profile. Education is
listed as an explanatory variable because, as mentioned,
our sample included lower-level workers, such as the
AISs. Thus, we expected variation in education levels
(Additional file 1). To counteract problems due to small
samples within single occupational types, we grouped
health workers into four major categories: medical doctor
(very few observations) or nurse; midwife; assistant mid-
wife; and AIS [27]. The variable “dual practice” assessed
whether a health worker held an additional permanentpost. The variable “performance evaluation in the last
year” measured whether the health worker had undergone
an evaluation within the previous year. Six dichotomous
variables assessed whether the health worker had received
training in any of five specific fields over the past
12 months (emergency obstetric care and neonatal care;
pro-poor targeting; user fee exemption; health insurance;
facility financial management). Two variables measured
health workers’ perceptions regarding their capacity to in-
fluence decision-making processes and control work at
their facility. Both variables elicited answers on a Likert
scale with values ranging from 0 to 10.
Five variables measured facility-level characteristics,
specifically: rural vs. urban location; facility type (1 = pri-
mary facility; 2 = secondary facility – including the few
regional hospitals included in the sample; 3 = private);
district; number of clinical staff assigned as personnel;
and proportion of very poor people residing in a specific
district. This last variable was computed using data from
the parallel household survey conducted in the catch-
ment areas of all facilities included in our sample. We
computed this variable by looking at how many people
were listed in the lowest wealth quintile in each of the
districts. To generate this variable, we first computed an
asset-based wealth index for the overall sample (i.e.,
pooling data from all 24 districts) and then checked
what proportion of very poor resided in each district.
We treated this as a continuous district-level variable,
with district-specific values ranging from 0 to 1.
In addition to exploring what factors caused variation in
knowledge and application of exemption policies, we in-
cluded a secondary outcome, asking health workers to
identify what proportion of the total population should be
considered ultra-poor and therefore be exempted from pay-
ing user fees. Five categorical options were provided (1%,
5%, 10%, 20%, 25%).
Analytical approach
We used univariate descriptive statistics to explore the dis-
tribution of the variables of interest in the sample. We ran
an ANOVA model with a Sidak multiple-comparison test
to identify statistically significant differences across districts
for each of the four outcome variables. Given the large
number of districts in our sample, we grouped districts that
displayed values close to average (i.e., districts whose values
on the four outcome variables on average deviated less than
ten percentage points in either direction) into one category
and compared them against the 10 remaining districts,
whose values on average diverged by more than +0.1 or
−0.1 from the mean of the four outcome variables.
We ran four random effects models (one for each out-
come variable) to identify associations between outcomes
of interest and selected sociodemographic and health facil-
ity characteristics of health workers. We used random
Table 1 List of variables and their measurements
Variables Measurement
Outcome indicators
Knowledge of directives regarding exemptions for indigents 0 = No; 1 = Yes
Application of indigent exemptions in facility (recoded)
Note: Question was recoded to 0 if response to filter question
“knowledge of directive for indigents” was “no”
0 = No; 1 = Yes
Knowledge of directive regarding delivery exemptions for
indigents
0 = No; 1 = Yes
Application of delivery exemptions for indigents (recoded)
Note: Question was recoded to 0 if response to filter question
“knowledge of delivery exemption directive” was “no”
0 = No; 1 = Yes
Individual characteristics
Sex of health worker 0 = Male; 1 = Female
Age of health worker
Note: Variable was centred for regression models
Continuous
Education of health worker (ordinal) 0 = No formal education or primary
1 = Junior high school
2 = Senior high school
3 = Higher education
Health worker type 1 = Nurse (IDE, IB, nursing assistant) or
medical doctor
2 = Midwife (midwife/birth attendant/
assistant midwife (AA, AB))
3 = Mobile health worker (AIS)
Head of health facility 0 = No; 1 = Yes
Years worked at facility
Note: Variable was centred for regression models
Continuous
Days of absence in past 30 days
Note: Variable was centred for regression models
Continuous (0–30)
Performance feedback received during past 12 months
Note: 453 cases imputed due to missing values
0 = No; 1 = Yes
Training in emergency obstetric and neonatal care 0 = No; 1 = Yes
Training – pro-poor targeting 0 = No; 1 = Yes
Training – user fee exemption 0 = No; 1 = Yes
Training – health insurance 0 = No; 1 = Yes
Training – facility (financial) management 0 = No; 1 = Yes
Influence on decisions in facility (perception) Scale: 0 = lowest to
10 = highest level
Control over facility (perception) Scale: 0 = lowest to
10 = highest level
Facility-level variables
Urban/rural 0 = Rural
1 = Urban
Health facility level 1 = Primary
2 = Secondary
3 = Private
Number of clinical staff at facility Continuous
District-level variables
Indigent household share in district (20th percentile of
asset index)
Note: household-level variables aggregated on district level
Continuous (0–1)
Secondary outcome indicator
Preference for selection of x% of the population to be
fully exempted
Categorical variable (1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 25%)
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clustering at the district level, based on the large observed
differences in knowledge and application of the exemption
mechanisms that emerged from our initial descriptive ana-
lysis. All four models accounted for clustering at the dis-
trict rather than the facility level for two reasons. First,
descriptive statistics suggested the presence of district-
level effects rather than of facility-level effects. Conceptu-
ally, this might be due to the influence of the district
health management team as well as to the mobility be-
tween facilities within a given district, a phenomenon that
is well-known in Burkina Faso [34, 35] and that provides a
conceptual grounding for our empirical analytical choice.
Second, the number of health workers interviewed in each
facility was very small (fewer than three health workers in
two-thirds of all facilities), which did not allow for mean-
ingful clustering at the facility level.
Specifically, we ran multilevel models with random coeffi-
cients in Stata version 13.1, using the xtlogit command. We
expressed our effect estimates as beta coefficients and dis-
played the standard errors. In the regression equation, Y
represented outcome variables, while X represented
explanatory variables. In a multilevel model, we assumed
that each class (subscript j), here districts, had a different
intercept coefficient (β0 j) and different slope coefficients
((β1 j, β2 j,…). Subscript i represented the individual units,
here health workers; e ij represented the residual errors.
The equation for each of the four multi-level regression
models was as follows:
Yij ¼ β0 j þ β1 jX1 ij þ β2 jX2 ij þ eij: ð1Þ
Results
Table 2 provides basic descriptive statistics regarding the
explanatory variables in our sample. The sample was
equally distributed between men and women, with nearly
90% of all health workers having completed either junior
high school (grade 10) or senior high school (grade 13).
Over one-fifth of all respondents were AISs, while medical
doctors and nurses made up 42% of the sample and mid-
wives and assistant midwives, 36%. Just over one-quarter
of all respondents were facility heads. On average, health
workers reported having been assigned to a given facility
for 3 years and having missed 3 days of work during the
preceding month. Nearly 70% of all respondents had
undergone a performance evaluation within the past year,
but very few had participated in any training. Nearly 90%
of all health workers surveyed worked in a first-line facil-
ity. Differences in numbers of respondents across districts
reflect underlying differences in district size.
Table 2 also displays health workers’ opinions regard-
ing the percentage of poor people that should be tar-
geted for exemption. Nearly 60% of the health workersindicated a preference for either 5% or 10% as appropri-
ate targeting goals.
Table 3 provides details on the proportions of respon-
dents who knew about the existence of either exemption
policy and of those who applied either of them. Both
knowledge and application of the indigent exemption for
preventive and curative services were extremely low,
with only 9.2% of all respondents knowing of its exist-
ence and 5% implementing it. Knowledge and applica-
tion of the delivery exemption were higher, with 27% of
all health workers being aware of it and 24.2% applying
it. Substantial differences were observed across districts
and between the two policies. For instance, only the dis-
tricts of Nouna and, to a lesser extent, Bousse displayed
significantly high levels of knowledge and application for
both sets of exemption directives, while other districts,
such as Batie, Nanoro, and Diebougou, where knowledge
and application of the delivery exemption were the high-
est, displayed very low levels of knowledge and applica-
tion of the indigent exemption. In these three districts,
as well as in Yako, not a single health worker reported
applying the indigent exemption policy.
Table 4 displays the estimates of the four random effects
models. The models identified only a handful of statisti-
cally significant associations between the health workers’
sociodemographic characteristics, the traits of the facility
where they worked, and the four outcomes of interest.
AISs were consistently better informed and more likely to
apply exemptions, both for indigents and for women at
delivery. Compared to other health workers, facility heads
were significantly more likely to know (0.922; p < 0.01)
and apply (2.031; p < 0.001) the indigent exemption, but
not the delivery exemption. Health workers who perceived
themselves as being in control of work at their facility
were consistently more likely to know indigents (0.100; p
< 0.05) and delivery exemptions (0.118; p < 0.001) and sig-
nificantly more likely to apply the delivery exemption
(0.098; p < 0.01). Health workers in districts with higher
proportions of very poor people were extremely more
likely to know (5.954; p < 0.01) and apply (4.921; p < 0.05)
the delivery exemption. The results of all four models con-
firmed the persistence of a district-level effect, i.e., the
presence of district-level variance that could not be
explained by the variables included in the model.
Discussion
Persistence of implementation gap impeding equity
The results are relatively disturbing, as they show that
very little has changed since the early 2000s. Health
workers have little concern for equity issues in West
Africa [36] and may not be sufficiently empowered to
promote equity in health. This study confirmed our earl-
ier qualitative and quantitative studies, which showed
that these user fee exemption policies were not being
Table 2 Univariate descriptive statistics
Mean / % SD N / n min max
Outcome indicators
Knowledge of indigent exemptions 7.09 0.2568 1311 0 1
Application of indigent exemptions (recoded) 5.03 0.2187 1311 0 1
Knowledge of delivery exemptions 25.86 0.4380 1311 0 1
Application of delivery exemptions (recoded) 23.26 0.4227 1311 0 1
Individual characteristics
Sex 100.00% 1311
Male 50.19% 0.5002 658 0 1
Female 49.81% 0.5002 653 0 1
Age 34.6 5.3925 1311 20 57
Education 100.00% 1311
No education or primary 2.75% 0.1635 36 0 1
Junior high school 29.82% 0.4577 391 0 1
Senior high school 58.73% 0.4925 770 0 1
Higher education 8.70% 0.2819 114 0 1
Health worker type 100.00% 1311
Nurse (IDE, IB, nursing assistant) or medical doctor 42.49% 0.4945 557 0 1
Midwife (midwife/birth attendant/assistant midwife
(AA, AB))
35.70% 0.4793 468 0 1
Mobile health worker (AIS) 21.82% 0.4132 286 0 1
Head of health facility 28.38% 0.4510 1311 0 1
Years worked at facility 3.0 2.5925 1311 0 24
Absence in past 30 days 3.2 5.5600 1311 0 30
Performance feedback received during past 12 months 68.96% 0.4629 1311 0 1
Training – emergency obstetric and neonatal care 5.57% 0.2294 1311 0 1
Training – facility (financial) management 1.68% 0.1285 1311 0 1
Influence on decisions (scale from 0 = lowest to 10 = highest) 5.9 3.0557 1311 0 10
Control over facility (scale from 0 = lowest to 10 = highest) 6.8 2.9283 1311 0 10
Facility-level variables
Environment 100.00% 1311
Rural 76.74% 0.4227 1006 0 1
Urban 23.26% 0.4227 234 0 1
Type of healthcare facility 100.00% 1311
Primary 87.80% 0.3275 1151 0 1
Secondary 10.22% 0.3030 134 0 1
Private/other 1.98% 0.1395 26 0 1
Number of clinical staff 3.7 2.2537 1311 1 12
District-level variables
Share of indigents in district (district-level variable) 22.03% 0.1196 24 0 0.6
District 100.00% 1311
Boromo 1.60% 0.1256 21 0 1
Nouna 8.62% 0.2808 113 0 1
Solenzo 7.09% 0.2568 93 0 1
Toma 2.67% 0.1613 35 0 1
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Table 2 Univariate descriptive statistics (Continued)
Mean / % SD N / n min max
Manga 2.14% 0.1446 28 0 1
Ouargaye 2.59% 0.1590 34 0 1
Tenkodogo 2.59% 0.1590 34 0 1
Zabre 0.76% 0.0870 10 0 1
Barsalgho 1.30% 0.1132 17 0 1
Kaya 12.20% 0.3275 160 0 1
Kongoussi 6.03% 0.2381 79 0 1
Ziniare 3.81% 0.1916 50 0 1
Doudougou 10.07% 0.3010 132 0 1
Nanoro 1.37% 0.1164 18 0 1
Reo 3.28% 0.1782 43 0 1
Sapouy 3.97% 0.1952 52 0 1
Bousse 3.05% 0.1721 40 0 1
Gourcy 6.18% 0.2409 81 0 1
Ouahigouya 13.42% 0.3410 176 0 1
Yako 3.20% 0.1762 42 0 1
Batie 1.07% 0.1028 14 0 1
Dano 0.84% 0.0913 11 0 1
Diebougou 1.91% 0.1368 25 0 1
Gaoua 0.23% 0.0478 3 0 1
Secondary outcome indicator
Preference for selection of % of the population
to be fully exempted
100,00% 1445
1% 5.81% 0.2341 84 0 1
5% 24.08% 0.4277 348 0 1
10% 33.08% 0.4707 478 0 1
20% 16.54% 0.3717 239 0 1
25% 20.48% 0.4037 296 0 1
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measures to support the worst-off and did so without
external funding, which is remarkable and speaks to the
high level of political will for equity, especially in the de-
livery exemption for the indigents [30]. However, polit-
ical will cannot stop at declarations and the formulation
of public policies; measures must be put in place to sup-
port their application. This gap was again noted recently
in Burkina Faso in the context of a national program to
cover indigents using mutual health insurance programs.
The program’s content was formulated and funded, but
it was never properly implemented, such that potential
indigent beneficiaries were once again left out [38]. Im-
plementation science has a long history, yet the lessons
it has offered for decades seem to have not yet come to
the attention of decision-makers [8, 39]. Even though a
causal link between knowledge and its application is not
guaranteed, as long as street-level workers do not knowthe content of policies, they will certainly not be able to
apply them. We have shown in previous work that issues
of equity and questions relating to exemption policies
are not on the health-related curricula in Burkina Faso
[40], and they are no longer a topic of discussion in na-
tional policy dialogues.
Our study suggests that only a small proportion of
health workers appear to know about issues pertaining
to targeting and exemption. That suggestion appears to
be confirmed by parallel data indicating that less than
2% of all health workers interviewed reported ever hav-
ing received explicit training on either exemption policy.
As such, there is definitely a pressing need for both basic
and continuing education on this issue if any action is to
be taken to close the obvious implementation gap. Fur-
thermore, the fact that health workers would like to keep
the indigent selection coverage to a low level (Table 2
shows that about 30% of health workers indicated less
Table 3 Comparison of means of selected districts (percentages of health workers knowing/applying the indigent and delivery
directives)
DISTRICTS (1) Knowledge of
indigent exemptions (%)
N (2) Application of indigent
exemptions (recoded)
(%)
N (3) Knowledge of
delivery exemptions
(%)
N (4) Application of delivery
exemptions (recoded) (%)
N
Boromo 7.14 28 3.70 27 53.57* 28 53.57** 28
Nouna 30.30*** 132 21.49*** 121 50.00*** 134 43.28*** 134
Manga 6.67 30 3.45 29 3.33 30 3.33 30
Kaya 2.30 174 1.16 173 6.90*** 174 3.45*** 174
Kongoussi 1.19 84 0.00 83 16.87 83 15.66 83
Nanoro 9.52 21 0.00 19 61.90** 21 61.90** 21
Bousse 26.67** 45 17.07** 41 37.78 45 35.56 45
Gourcy 3.57 84 1.20 83 14.29 84 10.71 84
Batie 4.35 23 0.00 19 73.91*** 23 68.18*** 22
Diebougou 6.25 32 0.00 41 59.38** 32 59.38*** 32
All other districts 8.12 850 4.19 836 25.71 848 23.40 846
Total 9.18 1503 4.98 1472 26.96 1502 24.21 1499
Selected districts with positive and significant relationships with the dependent variables. Districts grouped in “other” were all those whose value deviated from
the weighted average of the outcome indicators by no more than one point in either direction. Multiple comparison test applying Sidak correction. Comparison of
means of specific district vs. category “all other districts”. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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where 9% of the population lives in situations of extreme
poverty) confirms prior evidence [41] and may not be
due only to lack of training, but also to a lack of concern
for equity, as indicated in earlier research [22, 40].
Current payment systems, however, are also likely to be
largely responsible for the low application of the exemp-
tion policy, given the net gain that health providers
make on consultation fees and drug sales. In addition,
health workers may be also sincerely worried about the
impact of user fees exemptions on health centres’ finan-
cial sustainability in a context of cost-recovery schemes
and long reimbursement delays. A comparison of the
implementation processes for three indigent targeting
models in one district of the country showed, in fact,
that health workers had little financial incentive to ex-
empt indigents from paying user fees [42]. A pilot pro-
ject begun in 2015 to exempt indigents from user fees in
12 districts of the country, in which consultations and
health worker bonuses are being paid by the World
Bank [31], is expected to produce valuable lessons on
the effects of strategic purchasing on equity and on the
use of services by the worst-off.
The key roles of context and actors
This quantitative study provides new and very useful
knowledge for decision-makers, while also opening up
new and important research needs. For example, the
amount of variance in the outcome variable that is due
to districts cannot be explained by our model. Here is
where it is essential to study the role of context, but this
is still rarely done in this type of interventional research[43]. Even though the concept of context is still at a
stage that is not very “mature” [44], it has been used to
understand the heterogeneity of impacts of the delivery
subsidy policy in a district in the north of the country
[12], as well as why some women in a western district
continued to give birth at home [45] despite this policy.
It is thus important to undertake qualitative research to
understand the observed differences in the knowledge
and application of these policies between districts.
At the same time, however, this study was able to
show the preponderant role of certain contextual ele-
ments in explaining the results. For example, the distri-
bution of respondents in our samples suggests that AISs
were often present as healthcare providers in the centres
at the time of the survey. Our experience and evidence
[12, 27, 46] suggests that it is also very likely that this is
the case every day, and therefore that AISs are the ones
most in contact with populations and health services
users. Workers who are more qualified or have more re-
sponsibilities are more often absent and so do not attend
training sessions or go to meetings far from their health
centre. It is therefore logical that AISs are the ones who
are best informed and most concerned about this issue,
and that they would report applying the measures to a
greater extent. It would certainly be interesting to con-
sider relying more heavily on these health workers, who
need to be better trained, to ensure more diligent appli-
cation of the indigent policies.
Likewise, the leadership role of health centre heads or
district chief medical officers, well understood in the
country [34] was again highlighted by the results of this
study. The directive to exempt indigents was kept very
Table 4 Multilevel logistic regression (Random effects, sub-level: DISTRICT) (coefficients)
(1) Knowledge of
indigent exemptions
(2) Application of
indigent exemptions
(recoded)
(3) Knowledge of
delivery exemptions
(4) Application of
delivery exemptions
(recoded)
Sex female (base: male) −0.048 (0.2897) −0.096 (0.4238) 0.178 (0.1849) 0.342 (0.1927)
Education (base: Senior high school)
No education or primary −0.662 (0.7971) −0.866 (1.1117) 0.258 (0.4038) 0.352 (0.4069)
Junior high school 0.210 (0.2557) 0.056 (0.3718) 0.563*** (0.1648) 0.472** (0.1710)
Higher education 0.0795 (0.3801) 0.707 (0.4665) −0.517 (0.3084) −0.225 (0.3122)
Age (centred) 0.0063 (0.0212) −0.016 (0.0298) −0.026 (0.0146) −0.026 (0.0152)
Type of health worker (base: Midwife
(midwife/birth attendant/assistant
midwife (AA, AB))
Nurse (IDE, IB, nursing assistant) or
medical doctor
0.030 (0.3423) −0.187 (0.5488) 0.207 (0.2166) 0.316 (0.2283)
Mobile health worker (AIS) 0.436 (0.3535) 1.181* (0.5422) 0.372 (0.2137) 0.564* (0.2215)
Head of health facility 0.922** (0.3271) 2.031*** (0.5065) 0.076 (0.2203) 0.180 (0.2293)
Years worked at facility (centred) −0.010 (0.0452) 0.003 (0.0685) −0.018 (0.0314) −0.030 (0.0334)
Absence in past 30 days (centred) 0.008 (0.0178) 0.039 (0.0217) −0.024 (0.0141) −0.022 (0.0146)
Performance feedback received during
past 12 months
0.262 (0.2441) 0.194 (0.3623) −0.039 (0.1593) −0.121 (0.1663)
Training – emergency obstetric and
neonatal care
0.026 (0.5235) −0.991 (1.0983) −0.050 (0.3274) −0.417 (0.3655)
Training – facility (financial) management 0.122 (0.6932) −0.624 (1.1343) −0.409 (0.5998) −0.554 (0.6689)
Influence on decisions −0.059 (0.0378) −0.057 (0.0551) 0.012 (0.0260) 0.005 (0.0269)
Control over facility 0.100* (0.0463) −0.000 (0.0645) 0.118*** (0.0300) 0.098** (0.0310)
Urban (base: Rural) 0.509 (0.3352) 0.403 (0.5115) −0.027 (0.2365) 0.117 (0.2459)
Health facility level (base: Primary)
Secondary −0.398 (0.5728) −0.471 (1.0077) −0.640 (0.3812) −0.782 (0.4219)
Private/other 0.299 (0.8557) 0.711 (1.1867) 1.040 (0.5336) 0.351 (0.6395)
# of clinical staff −0.056 (0.0767) −0.158 (0.1175) −0.001 (0.0516) −0.061 (0.0558)
Share of indigents (aggr. by district) −3.335 (3.1934) −5.359 (5.6452) 5.954** (1.8221) 4.921* (2.0305)
Constant −2.993*** (0.8719) −3.459* (1.3780) −3.416*** (0.5658) −3.113*** (0.6109)
lnsig2u 0.142 (0.4145) 1.032* (0.5047) −0.642 (0.4059) −0.378 (0.3955)
sigma_u 1.074 (0.2225) 1.675 (0.4228) 0.726 (0.1472) 0.828 (0.1637)
rho 0.259 (0.0797) 0.460 (0.1254) 0.138 (0.0483) 0.172 (0.0564)
Observations 1345 1314 1345 1343
Wald chi2(20) 31.64* 43.58** 79.55*** 69.38***
LR ratio test of rho, chibar2(01) 72.53*** 67.76*** 56.43*** 68.18***
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Ridde et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2018) 17:5 Page 10 of 13confidential; only those in charge received it. They were
supposed to distribute the message to the health centres,
but this was not really done, as is often the case in West
Africa [47]. Top-down transmission of information in a
pyramidal structure is often not effective, as we showed
recently in the case of PBF in Burkina Faso [42]. It
would be interesting to discuss this hypothesis with the
district chief medical officers to understand how infor-
mation about these directives is distributed, knowing
there must still be large differences among districts.The environment in which health workers live and work
may also influence their ideas and views regarding poverty
and the needs of surrounding populations. This could ex-
plain why those living in districts with higher proportions
of indigents were more likely to know and apply the ex-
emption measures for deliveries but not for indigent
healthcare. This difference might be due to the fact that
the national policy on deliveries was more recent and bet-
ter organized [30] than the indigent care policy, which
remained more confidential [48]. Moreover, we saw that
Ridde et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2018) 17:5 Page 11 of 13those working in districts where efforts to support indi-
gents were actually implemented (e.g. Nouna [49]) knew
more about the exemption measures than did others. The
role of ideas in public policy implementation has been
widely debated in the scientific literature, both with re-
spect to public policies in general [4] and to policies on
user fee exemptions [50]. This study could show that, in
fact, there is a link.
Methodological considerations
The strength of this study lies in the large sample size
(1345 health workers on the primary outcomes) and geo-
graphic spread (24 districts), as well as in the application
of multilevel regression modelling techniques to assess as-
sociations between street-level workers’ knowledge and
application of exemption policy and socio-demographic
and health-facility factors. The large sample size contrib-
utes to the external validity of the study, providing re-
assurance that the results represent the variety of
experiences across the entire country. The application of
multilevel modelling techniques made it possible to pro-
duce a reliable analysis to identify relevant associations
with the outcomes of interest.
Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the presence of selec-
tion bias, since, as explained in the methods section, the
combination of the time available for the survey and the
caseload at the facility, allowed us to interview only 80%
of all health workers present on the day of the interview.
We have no means of assessing if the non-interviewed
health workers differed significantly from the inter-
viewed ones. In addition, we have to acknowledge pos-
sible social desirability reporting bias, especially in
relation to questions on the application of the exemption
mechanisms, and that actual behaviour in applying the
exemptions may differ from what was declared during
the survey. In addition, the lack of district-level explana-
tory variables (such as district leadership and manage-
ment, district wealth, existing health interventions, etc.)
made it impossible for us to expand the model and ex-
plain the district-level variance that persisted across all
models. Further studies looking into district-level char-
acteristics are urgently needed to explain the observed
geographical variance.
Conclusion
This study needs to be seen in the context of the new
national health financing strategy (2016–2030), which
emphasizes the importance of improving the functioning
of these exemption measures on the way to achieve
universal health coverage. It will be impossible to
achieve universal coverage by 2030 without formulating,
funding, applying, and evaluating measures specifically
targeting the worst-off [16]. Political will, once declared,
must be followed by application.This study showed that there is a significant gap be-
tween issuing directives and the actual inadequacy of
knowledge and application of these directives in the
country’s health facilities. Our results indicate that sub-
stantial training of healthcare staff (in addition to strong
MoH leadership to ensure the application) is required to
make exemption policies effective. Furthermore, trans-
mission of knowledge to health workers within facilities,
whether from facility heads or from health workers in
charge of the facility, needs to be ensured.
Additionally, it should be noted that thus far, the major-
ity of public health interventions have been focused on
improving either the service offer (e.g. quality, training) or
accessibility (e.g. financial, geographic). However, the
determinants of access to care are numerous, and it is
certainly time to mobilize collectively to combine policies
that reinforce the quality of services with those that can
ensure greater equity, particularly with respect to the
worst-off. Formulating exemptions for indigents and
improving their social determinants of health to support
their access to care health care [24, 51] is one step to
achieving greater equity, as long as it can be ensured that
those exemptions are actually then implemented and
applied in health facilities.
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